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Abstract
We analyze the spatial distribution of genetically modiﬁed (GM) and organic crops.
Because some organic crops will likely be contaminated by GM crops, not all of the non-
GM crops can be sold as organic. Therefore, the choice of producing organic crops will
depend on the surrounding crops. When producers follow individual strategies, many spatial
conﬁgurations arise in equilibrium, some being more eﬃcient than others. We examine how
coordination among producers has an impact on the spatial distribution of crop varieties.
We show that coordination among only a small number of producers can greatly improve
eﬃciency. For instance, an organic producer whoh a st w oG Mn e i g h b o r sn e e d st oc o o r d i n a t e
only with one of them to reduce spatial externality and improve eﬃciency.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The emergence of Genetically Modiﬁed (GM) crops represents a major innovation in modern
agricultural production. It is also a controversial one. To understand this controversy a key
economic aspect must be considered: the production of GM crops can indirectly raise the cost of
producing GM-free crops. Natural contamination phenomena such as cross-pollination or seed
contamination prevent producers from obtaining the price premium of GM-free labels in Europe
or organic labels in North America. This negative externality is at the core of what is known
as the coexistence problem between non-GM and GM crops. When non-GM varieties can be
contaminated by neighboring ﬁelds, the producer planting decision is no longer based solely on
the expected crop price. It becomes a strategic decision in which what other producers are
planting matters as well. Thus, whether GM-free crops are produced in equilibrium depends
on their relative price but also on existing spatial links between producers. Our objective is to
provide a theoretical framework aimed at analyzing strategic planting decisions within a rich set
of spatial contexts.
The existence of externalities due to the introduction of GM crops is now well documented.
To address this market failure many countries, mostly in Europe, have designed coexistence
regulations such as buﬀer zones, minimal distance requirement or legal liability rules in case
of contamination (Beckman et al., 2006). On the contrary, in North America, very few rules
and regulations are implemented (Berwald et al., 2006) and, yet, there is coexistence between
GM and organic crops (Brookes et al., 2004). For instance, Brookes and Barfoot (2004) report
signiﬁcant increases in areas of organic corn and soybean cultivated in the U.S. between 1995
and 2001. Interestingly perhaps, they also report that states such as Minnesota and Iowa, that
have an above average penetration of GM corn, are also those with the biggest areas of organic
corn planting. These observations suggest that even in the absence of regulation “natural”
coexistence can occur. Clearly, coexistence patterns and the magnitude of ineﬃciencies depend
on the localization of GM and organic varieties in the landscape. Should we see patchworks of
organic crops, or more organized clusters of GM and non-GM crops? How do spatial ineﬃciencies
arise in an environment characterized by individual decision makers and in absence of regulation?
2To answer these questions, we ﬁrst analyze the individual decision of producers to grow
organic crops in the presence of GM neighbors in a spatial model of variety choices with exter-
nalities. We derive the Nash equilibria of this spatial game of crop variety choice. We obtain
a multiplicity of equilibria with coexistence with diﬀerent spatial conﬁgurations, some being
more eﬃc i e n tt h a no t h e r s . T h em o r ee ﬃcient equilibria are those in which all organic or GM
producers are located next to each other in a way that minimizes negative externalities.
Following the analysis of individual decisions, we study what happens when producers can
coordinate their planting. In this second part of our analysis, we reexamine the previous ques-
tions in a context where producers can form coalitions of diﬀerent sizes in which they cooperate
in their variety choices. Producers need to coordinate their planting strategies with neigh-
bors who might potentially contaminate their crop. Contamination depends on the distance
of cross-pollination: the more neighboring producers who can potentially contaminate an or-
ganic producer, the higher the coordination costs since a producer has to coordinate with more
neighbors. To capture the fact that coordination costs are increasing with the size of the group
involved, we assume that coordination is costless within a restricted set of neighboring producers
and prohibitively costly above. We consider coalition deviations for coalitions of small size. We
show how these deviations can improve the eﬃciency of the spatial conﬁguration in equilibrium.
In the game theory terminology, we apply a variant of a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium, the
strong Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium concept introduced by Aumann (1959) requires that
the equilibrium strategies are robust to the deviation of not only single players but also groups
of players.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that in most spatial conﬁgurations coordination between two producers
is enough to greatly improve eﬃciency. For instance, if each producer is contaminated by two
neighbors, he needs to cooperate with only one of them to eradicate the negative externality
and improve eﬃciency. If each producer is contaminated by four neighbors, cooperating with
one of them greatly improves eﬃciency. Involving also a neighbor of the neighbor would further
reduce the externalities. Yet, coordination among four producers fully eliminates externalities.
The underlying issue of our paper is the economic justiﬁcation of coexistence regulations.
Following Coase, producers might be able to coordinate their planting strategies to eﬃciently
3localize GM and organic varieties without any regulation (Coase, 1960). However, a premise
of the Coasian argument is that the beneﬁts of coordination outweigh the costs. Although in
general these coordination costs might be diﬃcult to measure, they are natural (and possibly
low) in our spatial framework. Simple coordination processes for crop variety choices are fos-
tered by public authorities in some countries. For instance, in Spain GM producers must inform
their neighbors in advance about their intention to grow GM varieties (Brookes et al., 2004).
In Portugal, farmers can voluntary associate to create production areas exclusively dedicated to
the cultivation of GM or conventional varieties with the agreement of the ministry of agriculture
(Carvalho, 2011). As such, coexistence regulations become superﬂuous in these speciﬁca r e a s
simply because GM producers no longer have to comply with them. Following the implemen-
tation of this coordination initiative Carvalho (2011) reports that half of GM corns produced
in Portugal were planted in GM dedicated areas in 2010. In the same spirit, our model demon-
strates that if such coordination is possible, even between a small number of producers, eﬃciency
is restored in most spatial conﬁgurations.
Although there exists an abundant economic literature on issues related to GM crops, only a
few contributions are aimed at understanding the spatial localization of GM and non-GM crops
(Ceddia et al., 2011; Beckmann and Wesseler, 2005; Munro, 2008; Furtan et al., 2007). Because
of the spread of crops and their genes and the food labelling thresholds imposed by regulation to
prevent non-GM crops to be sold as organic,1 it is important to determine under what conditions
GM and non-GM crops can coexist. In a model of perfect competition with diﬀerent demands
for GM and non-GM food and ﬁxed land size, Munro (2008) shows that an equilibrium in which
there is coexistence between GM and organic crops does not necessarily exist. He investigates
how public intervention through taxes can help to restore eﬃciency. In our setting, we show that,
on the contrary, under speciﬁc conditions coexistence of GM and non-GM crops can happen and
that eﬃciency can be restored in the absence of public government intervention when producers
can coordinate. This is in line with recent studies that show that the existence of collaboration
1The threshold is such that at least 1% of the crop is contaminated. This threshold is for the European Union,
as stated by the Commission Regulation (ER) No 49/2000 (Beckmann and Wesseler, 2005) or EC No. 1830/2003
(Munro, 2008).
4between farmers reduces coexistence costs (Skevas et al, 2010). Belcher et al. (2005) develop a
model of GM contamination based on cellular automata. In their analysis, ﬁelds or “cell” can
contaminate others cells with some probability for some limited time and a dynamic study of
GM contamination spread is carried out. Unlike in Belcher et al. (2005), we choose to emphasize
the importance of coordination in human decisions to determine the extent of contamination.
To study the coexistence of GM and non-GM crops, a buﬀer zone can be introduced. Furtan,
et al. (2007) investigate the feasibility of such a buﬀer zone as well as the creation of a club of
organic producers. They provide historical evidence of social networking ability by Canadian
farmers and, by using wheat data from Saskatchewan, they show that only a high premium
for organic product makes the organic club feasible. Contrary to our contribution, they do not
explicitly analyze the physical localization of producers or their decision to produce organic
crops. However, the creation of a group of organic producers and their ability to cooperate is
also studied in our contribution. Our ﬁndings suggest that there is no longer coexistence when
producers can form coalitions.
Government intervention sets the threshold under which an organic crop cannot be considered
as organic if contaminated. This intervention has implications for spatial allocation of both crops
and their coexistence (Beckmann and Wesseler, 2005; Beckmann et al., 2009). Considering that
the coexistence problem is merely a problem of social cost (similar to the logic of Coase, 1960),
Beckmann and Wesseler (2005) analyze the impact of diﬀerent property rights (ex ante regulation
and ex post liability) on the localization choices of producers. Under a set of assumptions, they
show that the localization choice does not depend on the government intervention. When GM
producers are liable for the negative externalities created on non-GM producers, the introduction
of a liability rule for GM producers has an impact on the incentives to collaborate and to organize
GM crops areas. Our approach is diﬀerent as we consider the collaboration of organic producers
when they have to incur the cost of the negative externality. Beckmann et al. (2009) introduce
uncertainty and dynamic in a model where there is an irreversible eﬀect to adopt GM crops
because of speciﬁc investment. They provide the example of German regulation (mandatory
registration and minimum distance must be respected), where the adoption rate of GM crops is
relatively low. They explain this low rate by ex ante regulation costs and ex post liability costs.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the general model.
In section 3 we derive the Nash equilibria with coexistence and we provide two applications:
a linear model in which each producer has at most two neighbors and a grid in which each
producer has more than two neighbors. In section 4 we introduce coordination problems, and
we deﬁne conditions under which eﬃciency is greatly improved. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We ﬁrst consider a general framework in which a set of  = {1} farmers are localized
in a given particular landscape. Each farmer  ∈  produces one unit of crops. He chooses
whether to produce GM or non-GM crops. The non-GM crop is referred to as “organic crop”
e v e nt h o u g hi tc o u l dj u s tb el a b e l e dG M - f r e el i k ei ti sd o n ei nt h eE u r o p e a nU n i o nw h i c ha l l o w s
for 19% GM content. The two crop varieties diﬀer in costs and revenues. The GM (respectively,
organic) crop is sold at price  (respectively, ). Since consumers are willing to pay more
for GM-free food, there exists a price premium for organic crops,  −   0.2 The cost of
producing one unit of GM crops is normalized to zero. Hence, the proﬁt of a GM producer is
simply . Producing one unit of organic crops is costlier, and we denote 0 the organic crop
cost. The diﬀerence in costs captures the loss of yield due to pest attack or the cost of using
more pesticides, for instance. Organic producers are able to sell their crops labeled GM-free
if they are not contaminated by their GM neighbors. In order to consider contamination we
determine a probability of contamination or, equivalently, the fraction of crops contaminated
which depends on the variety choice of neighboring producers. Let  ⊂ \{} be the set of
neighbors of producer .3 Among these neighbors, we denote by 
 the set of GM producers
and 
 the set of organic producers, with 
 ∪
 = . Using similar notations, let  be the
2Consumers perceive GM and non-GM food products as diﬀerent, and consumers are willing to pay a premium
for certiﬁed GM free food (Noussair et al., 2004). In a recent paper, Lusk et al. (2005) conduct a meta-analysis
of 25 empirical studies on the willingness-to-pay for GM free foods. They ﬁnd that the simple average premium
for purchasing non-GM foods across all valuation studies is 29%.
3Neighbors might be more or less far away from a given producer depending on the distance between ﬁelds,
the wind, the landscape (e.g., if hedges or roads between ﬁelds).
6total number of neighbors of producer , 
 be the number of GM neighbors of  and 
 be the





 |. We assume that each producer in 
 contaminates producer  with probability 
for every  ∈  with 0 1.4 Therefore, the probability that producer  is contaminated by
his GM neighbors (or, equivalently, the fraction of his crops that is contaminated) is
 = 
  (1)
This contamination parameter  can, equivalently, be interpreted as the fraction of organic
crops sold as GM crops. Typically, crops located at the border of the ﬁeld close to GM crops
will be contaminated, whereas crops located in the center of the ﬁeld, or far away from GM
crops will not be contaminated. The more neighbors are producing GM crops, the higher the
contaminated surface. An organic producer  will harvest the borders of his ﬁeld separately and
sell the crops (as GM crops) at price . He therefore obtains revenues  on borders and
(1 − ) on the center of his ﬁelds. Since he has to incur the cost of producing organic crop
, the expected proﬁt of an organic producer who has 
 GM neighbors is

  +( 1− 
 ) −  (2)
We assume that prices  and  are given. These prices could be determined on the
world market, and we study the localization pattern of producers in a small area where their
production will not aﬀect world prices. For given prices many spatial conﬁgurations can be
considered. For instance, it can be the case that only GM crops are produced. This conﬁguration
is eﬃcient as there is no loss associated to spatial externalities. Indeed, GM producers do not
contaminate their GM neighbors. The situation is similarly eﬃcient if only organic crops are
produced: organic producers do not contaminate their organic neighbors. However, situations of
coexistence between GM and organic crops will not be eﬃcient as organic producers will always
be contaminated by some GM neighbors. By reducing spatial externalities, eﬃciency will be
improved and can even be restored.
4For simplicity, we assume that all neighbors have the same impact on an organic producer in terms of
probability of contamination. This assumption can be relaxed without altering qualitatively our results.
73 Coexistence Equilibrium
We now consider individual variety choices in the spatial model described above. More precisely,
we ﬁrst analyze the Nash equilibrium of the choice between organic and GM crops in the general
setting without any assumption on the sets  for every  ∈ . We then compute the Nash
equilibria in two particular cases when the spatial model is represented in a line or circle ( =1
or 2)a n di nag r i d(  =3or 4).
3.1 General setting
A Nash equilibrium of the spatial variety choice model is deﬁned by a set of GM producers 
and a set of organic producers  with ∪ = . An equilibrium is a situation from which
none of the producers has an incentive to deviate, given the decisions of the other producers.
Or, put diﬀerently, each producer chooses the variety that maximizes his expected proﬁtg i v e n
the variety choices of his neighbors. Consider any producer  ∈ . Given the variety choices

 and 
 of his GM and organic neighbors, and given prices  and , producer  ∈ 
prefers to plant organic crops if 
  +( 1− 
 ) −  ≥  which is equivalent to
(1 − 
 )( − ) ≥  (3)
The expected revenue premium of the organic crop should exceed its production cost. Sim-
ilarly, producer  ∈  chooses the GM variety if  ≥ 
  +( 1− 
 ) −  which is
equivalent to
(1 − 
 )( − ) ≤  (4)
A variety choice () is a Nash equilibrium if and only if conditions (3) and (4) hold for
every  ∈  and  ∈ .
Our model of spatial localization exhibits multiple equilibria, some being more eﬃcient than
others. Before describing these equilibria in the case of the line and the grid, we analyze some
of their properties. First, the equilibrium conditions (3) and (4) imply that 
 ≥ 
 ,w h i c h
means that organic producers are surrounded by weakly less GM producers. Second, organic
and GM crops might not coexist in the landscape. In particular, only GM crops are planted in
8equilibrium for parameters (prices, cost, contamination probability, number of neighbors) such
that for every  ∈ 





Similarly, there is a Nash equilibrium in which only organic crops are planted if −  .T h e
two varieties coexist in a Nash equilibrium () if  6= ∅ (or, equivalently, if  6= ∅).
Combining (3) and (4), the equilibrium condition with coexistence can be summarized as follows









To determine more general equilibrium conditions, we consider the organic and GM producers
who have the highest incentive to deviate to another variety. If these producers do not deviate,
then none of the producers will have an incentive to deviate. An organic producer who is
contaminated by many GM neighbors might have an incentive to become a GM producer as
well. Therefore, the organic producer who has the highest number of GM neighbors has the
higher incentive to deviate and, thus, we concentrate on this individual. If he does not deviate,
none of the other organic producers (with lower incentive to deviate) will do so. Let
 =m a x
∈
  (6)
be the maximum number of GM neighbors that an organic producer  ∈  might have. Along
the same lines, a GM producer who has many GM neighbors has little incentive to become an
organic producer as he will get a high level of contamination. On the other hand, a GM producer
who has few GM neighbors might consider becoming an organic producer. Thus, we consider
the incentive to deviate of a GM producer who has only a few GM neighbors and, therefore, a
low probability to be contaminated if he decides to produce organic crops. We deﬁne
 =m i n
∈
  (7)
the lowest number of GM neighbors that a GM producer  ∈  might have.
By deﬁnition of  and , the coexistence equilibrium condition (5) holds if and only if it
holds for the organic producer with  GM neighbors and for the GM producer with  organic
neighbors. We thus posit the following Proposition.
9Proposition 1 A variety choice () is a Nash equilibrium with coexistence if only if

1 − 




where  and  are deﬁned by (6) and (7).
Following directly from Proposition 1, we can provide a necessary condition for a Nash
equilibrium with coexistence to exist.
Corollary 1 A necessary condition for Proposition 1 to hold is that
 ≥  (9)
As long as the maximum number of GM neighbors of an organic producer is smaller than
the minimum number of GM neighbors of a GM producer, and prices satisfy inequality (8), an
equilibrium exists. Note that there are many candidates to the coexistence equilibrium. Some
of them are more eﬃcient than others. The more eﬃcient equilibria are those with the lowest
negative externalities. In other words, an equilibrium is more eﬃcient than another one when
the organic producers have less GM neighbors (if any), as it reduces the negative externalities.
To illustrate this analysis of the coexistence equilibrium we provide two applications of the
general framework. The ﬁrst application is a linear (or circular) model in which each producer
has at most one or two neighbors. The second application is a grid which is more general as a
producer can have three or four neighbors.
3.2 The linear model: one or two neighbors
We ﬁrst consider the simplest model of variety choice with a spatial representation by locating
producers along a line. Producers are located along the line from 1 to . Each producer 
has two neighbors  − 1 and  +1except for producers located at the extreme 1 and  who
have only one neighbor. An alternative linear representation of the spatial model is a circle in
which producer 1 is neighbor to producer . In the circular model each farmer has exactly two
neighbors. Formally,  ∈ {12} for every  ∈ . In the linear model, 1 =  =1and  =2
for every  ∈ \{1}. In the circular model,  =2for every  ∈ .
10We focus on coexistence variety choice Nash equilibria. Clearly, some spatial conﬁgurations
cannot be sustained in equilibrium. For instance, consider the conﬁguration represented in
Figure 1 where  represents an organic producer and  a GM producer.
O G O G O G O O
Figure 1: Not an equilibrium conﬁguration
Since a producer with two GM neighbors chooses to plant organic crops, his expected payoﬀ
from doing so should not be lower than if he was a GM producer, i.e., 2+(1−2)− ≥ .
Similarly, since a producer with two organic neighbors plants GM crops, it must be that his
expected payoﬀ is weakly higher from doing so, even though his crops would not be contaminated,
 ≥  − . These two conditions cannot be satisﬁed together. Indeed, the GM producer has
an incentive to deviate and produce organic crops as he will face no risk of contamination. On
the other hand, the organic producer should produce GM crops since his contamination risk
is maximal with all his neighbors producing GM crops. Hence, in equilibrium some spatial
conﬁgurations of crop variety choices are excluded in the landscape. However, many diﬀerent
conﬁgurations might still emerge in a Nash equilibrium even in the simplest spatial model
represented by the line.
We now describe some properties of these equilibria by applying Proposition 1 and Corollary
1 before comparing their eﬃciency. Under coexistence of both varieties in the linear model, at
least one organic producer is neighbor to a GM producer which implies  ≥ 1. Similarly, at
least one GM producer is neighbor to an organic producer which implies that   2 since  ≤ 2
for every  ∈ . Moreover, according to Corollary 1, in a Nash equilibrium with coexistence,
the number of GM producers in the neighborhood should not be higher for organic producers
than for GM producers. Therefore,  ≤ . Combining these three last inequalities leads to
only one value for  and  under coexistence:  =  =1  which means that the producers
who are more likely to deviate have one GM neighbor. The other neighbor, if any, is an organic
producer. This precludes the conﬁguration of Figure 1 in which a producer of one type of crops
is located between two producers of the other type of crops. An equilibrium with coexistence
exists only if a producer of one type of crops is located next to at least one producer of the
11same type of crops. Moreover, with  =  =1 , the equilibrium condition from Proposition 1
becomes




In fact, the producers who are the more likely to deviate have the same payoﬀ with both varieties,
 +( 1− ) −  = . These producers are indiﬀerent between producing organic and GM
crops. Figure 2 below represents several spatial equilibrium conﬁgurations in the case of a line
of eight producers with the same number of GM and organic producers. It is just an example
of comparable conﬁgurations as many other equilibria with coexistence exist with 2, 4 or 6 GM
(or organic) producers.5
O O G G O O G G
G G O O G G O O
O O O O G G G G
O O G G G G O O
Figure 2: Some equilibrium conﬁgurations with the same number of each producer
These four conﬁgurations however diﬀer in eﬃciency. Although as much organic crops are
planted in all of these equilibrium conﬁgurations (|| =4 ), the spatial dispersion is better in
t h el a s tt w oc o n ﬁgurations because less organic crops (or a lower proportion of organic crops)
will be contaminated on average. The most eﬃcient conﬁguration is the third one in which all
producers of each variety are located in the same area. In this case, the risk or proportion of
contamination is minimized to one organic producer.
5Note that producers with only one neighbor, i.e., producers located at the extreme of the line, are not always
planting organic crops in a Nash equilibrium with coexistence. Indeed, as long as their only neighbor is planting
GM crops, producers 1 and  are indiﬀerent between planting organic and GM crops. Therefore, an equilibrium
with producers 1 and/or  producing GM crops (e.g., ﬁrst and third conﬁgurations in Figure 2) is consistent with
the equilibrium condition (10).
12To summarize, in the case of one or two neighbors represented by a line, many spatial
conﬁgurations with coexistence might emerge, some being more eﬃcient than others. In a line
with more than two producers (i.e., if some producers have two neighbors), the equilibrium
condition requires that organic producers neighbor to a GM producer are also neighbor to an
organic producer (providing that he has two neighbors). The same applies for GM producers: if a
GM producer is neighbor to an organic producer, his other neighbor should be a GM producer.
These producers are more likely to change their variety choice as they are indeed indiﬀerent
between the two varieties.
3.3 The grid model: three or four neighbors
T h ec a s eo ft h eﬁnite grid is arguably richer than the case of the linear model characterized
above as producers can be surrounded by more than two neighbors. We consider a ﬁnite grid as
described in Figures 3 and 4 where each point in the grid represents a producer and both ﬁgures
contain diﬀerent conﬁgurations.
Insert Figures 3 and 4
In the grid, we represent an organic producer by a black dot, and all the other points in
the grid correspond to GM producers. In this setting, a producer is connected to at most four
adjacent neighbors (left, right, above and below) but has only two adjacent neighbors in the
corners. This richer model allows us to consider more externalities than in the linear case.
We call a patch a collection of organic producers who are all connected at least once to each
other; a patch is continuous. We distinguish two exclusive types of patch: islands and borders.
An island is a patch of connected organic producers fully surrounded by GM producers. On the
other hand, a border has at least one producer “touching” the grid limit. In Figures 3 and 4,
patterns , , , , , , ,a n d are islands while , , ,a n d represent borders.
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, there is potentially a wide variety of patches.6 However, exactly
6Not all possible conﬁgurations are represented in Figures 3 and 4. For instance one can think about a ring
with one GM producer in the middle of organic producers.
13like in the case of the linear model, not all of them are likely to exist for two reasons. First,
some patches do not represent equilibrium situations. Second, even though patches are robust
to single deviations and represent an equilibrium situation, some of them will be more eﬃcient
than others. The more eﬃcient ones will be those with fewer negative externalities.
We ﬁrst consider equilibrium conditions and eﬃciency in the case of islands before examining
the case of borders. Islands represent spatial conﬁgurations in which organic producers are
located in the middle of GM producers (conﬁgurations , ,  in Figure 3 and , , , ,
 in Figure 4). Not all of the islands will be sustained in equilibrium. Following directly from
Corollary 1, we can already rule out islands ,  and  in Figures 3 and 4 that are not robust
to single deviation. Indeed, for island ,  =2and  =3 , for island ,  =2and  =3
and for island ,  =3and  =4 . In all these spatial conﬁgurations the necessary condition
 ≥  is violated.
Also, following directly from Proposition 1 we obtain that for spatial conﬁgurations in which
 =  a coexistence equilibrium exist if




This is the case for islands  and  in Figure 4 in which  =  =3and, therefore, it is an
equilibrium of coexistence if  −  = (1 − 3)
On the other hand, for patches such that    a coexistence equilibrium exists if

1 − 




This happens with conﬁgurations  and  in Figure 3 and  in Figure 4. The left hand side
of (11) implies that any GM producer surrounding an island is not connected to another island
or to the grid limit. If a GM producer is connected to the grid limit, the necessary condition
 ≥  is no longer satisﬁed so it is not an equilibrium conﬁguration.
This leads us to consider borders such as conﬁgurations , ,  and  in Figures 3 and 4.
A set of organic producers belong to a border when every organic producer within the set has at
least one GM neighbor and at most three GM neighbors. Because borders have less externalities
14than islands (at most three GM neighbors versus four in the case of the island), organic producers
in a spatial conﬁguration such as a border enjoy a natural advantage compared to islands.
However, not all of the borders represent a Nash equilibrium with coexistence. For instance,
conﬁguration  in Figure 4 in which  =0and  =2cannot be an equilibrium according to
Corollary 1 as   . On the other hand, all the other conﬁgurations , ,  in Figures 3 and
4 are potential candidates for an equilibrium. However, if  −  6= (1 − 2),c o n ﬁguration
 in Figure 4 cannot be an equilibrium. More generally, there exists no equilibrium in which a
border entails one organic producer with two GM neighbors if  −  6= (1 − 2).
By applying Proposition 1 we show that the most exposed organic producer has one GM
neighbor and will deviate if  −  ≥ (1 − ), while a GM producer will not deviate if
(1 − 2) ≥  − . By putting together these inequalities we obtain that there exists a








A border similar to the spatial conﬁguration  in Figure 3 will therefore be an equilibrium
with coexistence. Furthermore, this variety choice Nash equilibrium represents a more eﬃcient
conﬁguration as each organic producer has at most one GM neighbor, which reduces the negative
externalities due to contamination.
To summarize, in the case of a grid as represented in Figures 3 and 4, conﬁgurations , , 
in Figure 3 and , ,  and  in Figure 4 represent equilibrium situations with coexistence. In
all of these conﬁgurations an organic producer has at least one organic neighbor and, therefore,
at most three GM neighbors. Some of these patches have three GM neighbors which implies
many negative externalities. Patches with fewer externalities are the more eﬃcient ones as is
t h ec a s ef o rc o n ﬁguration  whereas, for the same number of organic producers, island  is
strictly more eﬃcient than island .
154 Coordination Among Producers
In this section we extent our analysis to coordination problems. We ﬁrst consider the general
case before exploring the two applications developed in the previous section.
4.1 General setting
In the general setting we have shown that there exists an equilibrium in which both types of
crops coexist if condition (5) is satisﬁed. In other words, for given prices, as long as an organic
producer has less GM neighbors than does a GM producer, it is possible to have coexistence
between organic and GM crops. However, an organic producer might try to convince a GM
producer (or maybe a few GM producers) to switch to organic crops. The two producers will
therefore form a coalition and make their production choice accordingly. To keep our model
simple we abstract from any coordination cost.7 Within this new setting, we investigate whether
the coexistence variety choice equilibrium is still robust and what are the implications in terms
of eﬃciency.
To see whether an equilibrium with coexistence is robust to coordination, we consider a
situation in which two neighbors (an organic producer and a GM producer) have the same
number of GM neighbors,  =  = . If the organic producer succeeds in convincing the GM
producer to switch to organic crops, the organic producer is left with ( − 1) GM neighbors
while the former GM producer (who is now an organic producer) still has  GM neighbors. The
aggregate payoﬀ for both producers is
( − 1) +( 1− ( − 1)) −  +  +( 1− ) −  (12)
when they coordinate their planting decision. In absence of coordination, the aggregate payoﬀ
is
 +( 1− ) −  +  (13)
As long as the coordination payoﬀ (12) is greater than the aggregate payoﬀ without coordination
(13), the organic producer convinces the GM producer to switch to organic crops. This occurs
7In fact, as long as coordination costs are relatively small our ﬁndings are robust.
16if
 −  

1 − ( − 1)

According to Proposition 1, at the equilibrium, if  =  = , the following condition must
be satisﬁed









1 − ( − 1)
is always satisﬁed for any , both organic and GM producers gain from coordination. This
leads to more eﬃciency as organic producers will be gathered together, which will reduce the
negative externalities due to contamination. Many of the coexistence variety Nash equilibria
determined in the previous section are not eﬃcient due to the negative externalities created by
contamination. Therefore, coordination, by reducing the number of externalities, leads to more
eﬃciency. We summarize this ﬁnding in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 If  =  and the organic producer with the maximum number of GM neighbors
i sn e x tt ot h eG Mp r o d u c e rw i t ht h em i n i m u mn u m b e ro fG Mn e i g h b o r s ,t h ee q u i l i b r i u mi s
not robust to coordinations of two producers. Therefore coordination among two producers can
improve eﬃciency.
The result of Proposition 2 still holds when   , but not for all the values of the
parameters. Indeed, consider again that the organic producer with the maximum number of
GM neighbors is located next to the GM producer with the minimum number of GM neighbors.
In this case the aggregate payoﬀ from coordination is
( − 1) +( 1− ( − 1)) −  +  +( 1− ) − 
whereas, absent any coordination, the aggregate payoﬀ of the two producers would be
 +( 1− ) −  + 
17Therefore, both organic and GM producers will be better oﬀ if the GM producer becomes an
organic producer if
 −  ≥

1 − ( − 1)

According to Proposition 1, an equilibrium with coexistence exists if condition (8) is satisﬁed.
As





is always satisﬁed, the coexistence equilibrium will not be robust to coordination if

1 − 
≥  −  ≥

1 − ( − 1)

To summarize, even though coordination among GM and organic producers eliminates co-
existence variety choice Nash equilibrium, it leads to more eﬃciency as it reduces the negative
externalities.
4.2 Linear model
In the linear (or circular) model where each producer has (at most) two neighbors, we have
shown that coexistence between crop varieties exists if  ≤ .W en o wi n v e s t i g a t et h ei m p a c t
of a coalition of two producers on the equilibrium with coexistence. To do so, we consider
that an equilibrium with coexistence exists with  ≥ 1 and  ≤ 1. In the case of the circle,
the maximum number of GM neighbors that an organic producer can have is two, whereas the
minimum number of neighbors that a GM producer can have is zero. However, if  =2 ,t h e r e
is no coexistence equilibrium, therefore we must have  =1 . On the other hand, if  =0 ,
there is no equilibrium with coexistence either, therefore we must have  =1 .T h u s , = .
From Proposition 2, because  =  there is deviation from the equilibrium with coexistence
as a coalition of two producers will always make them better oﬀ. Coordination leads to more
eﬃciency as it eliminates the negative externalities.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 In the linear model, eﬃciency is restored with only a coalition of two producers.
184.3 The grid model
We now consider coordination within the grid model where each producer has at most four
neighbors. Because each organic producer can have more than two neighbors, coalitions of more
than two producers must be considered as well.
We ﬁrst consider coordination by coalitions of two producers. It is easy to show that islands
are not robust to the deviation of coalitions of two producers. In islands of spatial conﬁguration
 or  in Figure 3 an organic producer located in the corner of the island is neighbor to two
GM producers and two organic producers. Formally, there exists an organic producer  such
that 
 =2 . Producer  is neighbor to a producer  who is surrounded by three GM producers
and therefore 
 =3 . If the organic producer  convinces the GM producer  to switch to
organic crops, both producers could achieve together a total payoﬀ of  − ( − ) −  +
 −3( −)− as producer  will have only one GM neighbor. Both producers will form a
coalition if their total payoﬀ from coordination is higher than their aggregate payoﬀ absent any
coordination, 0 − 2( − ) −  + . Formally, the organic producer can convince the GM
producer to switch to organic crops if 0−2( −)− , which holds by the equilibrium
conditions in Proposition 1 (otherwise the organic producer will plant GM seeds in equilibrium).
Put diﬀerently, if the GM producer  switches to organic crops he loses −(−3(−)−)
but it increases the organic producer ’s payoﬀ by (−). The increase of producer ’s payoﬀ
is higher than the loss incurred by producer  which leads to the above inequality.
We consider further coordination by excluding islands from spatial conﬁguration equilibrium
in the grid. Namely, we consider only “borders” (see conﬁguration  on Figure 3) and “stripes”
( and  in Figure 5 are examples of stripes) of organic producers of any size.8
Insert Figure 5
Each GM producer who is the neighbor of an organic producer is also the neighbor of three
8We exclude the case of GM producers with two neighbor organic producers (i.e., a stripe of GM producers
surrounded by two stripes of organic producers) because it is obviously not robust to the deviation of coalitions
of size two.
19GM producers, except those who are located at the border of the grid in  who have only three
neighbors, two being GM producers. Therefore  =2 . Organic producers who are the more
exposed to GM contamination have  =1GM neighbors.
We ﬁrst consider the deviation of the coalition formed by the organic producer  located at
the border of the grid and his only GM neighbor producer  (see stripe  in Figure 5). With
this spatial conﬁguration 
 =  =2 . If the two producers produce organic crops, their total
payoﬀ is  −  + 0 − 2( − ) −  which is higher than their aggregate payoﬀ absent any
cooperation  − ( − ) −  +  if  − ( − ) −  ≥ . This last inequality is also
the equilibrium condition (see Proposition 1). Hence, the coexistence equilibrium is not robust
to the deviation of coalitions of size two.
Lastly we examine the coordination of size bigger than two in grids without border such as
stripe  in Figure 5. This more abstract conﬁguration can be thought as one in which stripes
are unbounded.9 In this case where  =1and  =3 , Proposition 1’s equilibrium condition is

1 − 3




Graphically, this case corresponds to an organic producer located in the middle of stripe  or
. This organic producer can convince his GM neighbor to switch to organic if  −  + 0 −
3(−)− 0−(−)−+ which is equivalent to − ≥ (1−2). Therefore,
equilibria with coexistence with price diﬀerence − ∈ [(1−2)(1−3)] are not robust to
coordination of size two while those with stripes verifying − ∈ [(1−)(1−2)] are. Yet
the latter are not robust to coalition deviations of size four. To see this, suppose that the organic
producer and one of his organic neighbor convince their respective GM neighbors to switch to
organic crops. Then the coalition gain that they obtain, 2( − )+2 (  − 2( − ) − )
is higher than their aggregate payoﬀ, 2( − ( − ) − )+2 ,i f −  ≥ (1 − )
which holds in equilibrium. The stripe  is therefore not robust to coordination of size four.
This argument holds for any size of the stripe (e.g., with more than two GM producers) because
it involves only producers at the border. Hence the negative externalities are eradicated and
eﬃciency is restored when producers in the grid without borders form a coalition of size four.
9In a ﬁnite setting, such a conﬁguration would be obtained when two concentric circular areas are such that
the smaller circle receive organic crop while the outer ring receives GM crops.
20Overall, we see that all equilibrium conﬁgurations involving coexistence are not robust to
deviation of small coalitions of producers. The next result summarizes our ﬁndings in the grid
case with and without borders.
Proposition 4 The coordination of several producers can eliminate spatial externalities (i.e.,
coexistence) in the following grid cases
1. Any island is not robust to coordination by two producers.
2. In a grid with borders, stripes and borders are not robust to coordination by two producers.
A coordination with two producers eliminates spatial externalities.
3. In a grid without borders, coordination of four producers eliminates spatial externalities.
This result shows that in the grid case with borders — a conﬁguration close to many real
spatial conﬁgurations — a coordination involving two producers will be enough to eliminate
ineﬃciencies.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have developed a spatial variety choice model in which farmers decide to produce
either organic or GM crops. For an individual producer, this decision is strategic since it also
depends on the decision of the other producers.
Because of contamination, the decisions to produce GM crops will have negative externalities
on an organic producer. In this setting, we characterize the coexistence variety choice Nash
equilibrium. Spatial externalities might preclude coexistence in equilibrium, even though we can
describe situations in which there is coexistence. However, there exist many coexistence variety
choice equilibria, some being more eﬃcient than others. More eﬃcient equilibria represent
spatial conﬁgurations in which less organic producers are contaminated. By allowing producers
to coordinate their production choice, we show that coexistence tends to disappear, which leads
to more eﬃcient outcomes. Indeed, less coexistence means that organic producers will suﬀer
less from the negative externality due to contamination. Our ﬁndings suggest that whenever
21coexistence exists, by letting producers coordinate their production choice leads to more eﬃcient
situations. In other words, not all the situations will require some external intervention.
In this simple model, we have not been considering any regulation. We show that, even
in absence of regulation, coordination can restore eﬃciency. In our setting, the introduction of
regulatory tools favorable to organic producers (e.g., buﬀer zone) would probably reduce the cost
 and reduce the contamination parameter . Therefore, following Proposition 1, for low values
of the price of organic crops more coexistence will occur, whereas for high values of the organic
price, there will be less coexistence. In fact, the constellation of parameters for which there exists
an equilibrium as deﬁned by equation (8) will change. Coordination between producers will also
happen and restore eﬃciency as it reduces spatial externalities. Therefore, in our model, the
introduction of regulation tools will not aﬀect qualitatively our ﬁndings. In the spirit of Coase
(1960), it would not aﬀect the size of welfare achieved when producers coordinate their variety























Figure 4: possible conﬁgurations in the grid model
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Figure 5: coordination among producers in the grid model
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